MAJOR HYPOCRISY ALERT: Senate Votes 94-0 to Override Obama on Iran Sanctions! Also, obviously, A Reminder: Iran still working on an atomic bomb; How Not to Deter Hamas (and Iran); Islamists pushing Egypt to civil war; Obama and Abbas Are Destructive to the People They Represent; and How the U.N. Will Destroy Leftists’ Dreams of a ‘Two-State Solution’

Posted on December 1, 2012

Beyond of course the unquestionable need for tougher sanctions because yes Iran is continuing their pursuit of nuclear weapons, a middle east map with a big hole where Israel once was, and worldwide armaggedon, the real back story here is that Obama’s campaign rhetoric on Iran juke got nuked. Just as importantly this proves that the Democrats in the Senate were willing to be dishonest before the elections by supporting Obama’s dishonesty on the subject, only to take this contradictory action post-election !!!
The Senate approved new economic sanctions on Iran on Friday, overriding [Full Story]

Reminder: Iran still working on an atomic bomb

Rick Moran  November 28, 2012

The Associated  Press has gotten a hold of a graph leaked by ” officials from a country  critical of Iran’s atomic program to bolster  their arguments that Iran’s  nuclear program must be halted before it  produces a weapon.”

Iranian  scientists have run computer simulations for a nuclear weapon  that would  produce more than triple the explosive force of the World  War II bomb that  destroyed Hiroshima, according to a  diagram obtained by  The Associated Press.

The  diagram was leaked by officials from a country critical of Iran’s  atomic  program to bolster their arguments that Iran’s nuclear program  must be halted  before it produces a weapon.  The officials provided the  diagram only on condition that they and their country not be  named.

The  International Atomic Energy Agency – the Vienna-based U.N.  nuclear watchdog –  reported last year that it had obtained diagrams  indicating that Iran was  calculating the “nuclear explosive yield” of  potential weapons. A senior  diplomat who is considered neutral on the  issue confirmed that the graph  obtained by the AP was indeed one of  those cited by the IAEA in that report. He  spoke only on condition of  anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss  the issue.

The  IAEA report mentioning the diagrams last year did not give  details of what they  showed. But the diagram seen by the AP shows a bell  curve – with variables of  time in micro-seconds, and power and energy  both in kilotons – the traditional  measurement of the energy output, and  hence the destructive power of nuclear  weapons. The curve peaks at just  above 50 kilotons at around 2 microseconds,  reflecting the full force  of the weapon being modeled.

The  bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima in Japan during  World War II,  in comparison, had a force of about 15  kilotons. Modern  nuclear weapons have yields hundreds of times higher than  that.

The  diagram has a caption in Farsi: “Changes in output and in energy  released as a  function of time through power pulse.” The number “5” is  part of the title,  suggesting it is part of a series.

If  the world doesn’t care by now, they are not likely to care when Iran is nuclear  capable. Only collective action by the world community of the most draconian  kind can stop them now. And since that’s not likely to happen, and since Obama  is not likely to lift a finger unless Iran tests a device, Israel is alone in  deciding whether to use military force to stop them.

How Not to Deter Hamas (and Iran)

By Jonathan  F. Keiler  November 28, 2012

According to Israel’s Defense Minister, Ehud  Barak, the first purpose of in launching Pillar of Defense, the country’s most  recent Gaza campaign, was “to strengthen our deterrence.” Now that the operation  has concluded, there appears to be little confidence in Israel, at least outside of the Netanyahu government troika that negotiated a cease-fire agreement with Hamas,  that Pillar of Defense will deter Hamas from much of anything. And looking on is  Iran. If Israel can’t deter a thuggish terror outfit like Hamas, how is it going  deter its larger and infinitely more dangerous sponsor, Iran? One thing is  certain, Israel will never, and has never deterred its enemies by launching  operations in which the stated goal is deterrence.

It  is not that Israel’s enemies cannot be deterred. Despite the unending enmity and  hatred of the three major Muslim Arab states that directly border it (Egypt,  Jordan, and Syria) Israel has, since 1948, emerged as a relatively secure and  powerful regional state, increased its population ten-fold, and given its  population a standard of living that rivals the most prosperous Western states,  and absolutely shames those Arab states in practically every meaningful category  of economic success, military power, freedom, and just, effective governance.  Egypt, its most powerful enemy, concluded a formal peace agreement three decades  ago. Jordan followed suit twenty years ago. Syria, which remains implacable, has  nonetheless maintained a truce for nearly 40 years.

But  these successes were not won by Israel’s pursuit of deterrence. Rather they were  the result of four bloody full-scale wars waged between 1948 and 1973. In those  conflicts, Israel did not fight to deter its enemies but to defend its borders,  seize territory from which the Arabs launched attacks, and destroy Arab armies.

Arab  nations were not deterred from war by any deliberate Israeli policy of  deterrence but by traditional wars, waged with traditional objectives.  Deterrence was just a salutary side effect of actual repeated military success.

Beginning  in the late 1970s, facing nontraditional, nonstate enemies, Israel began waging  wars of deterrence with much less success. In 1978 and again in 1982 Israel went  into Lebanon with the stated purposes of driving back PLO terrorists (and Syrian  anti-aircraft batteries), deterring  further attacks, and securing Israel’s northern border, rather than defeating or  annihilating its enemies. The result was that even when the Israelis secured  military successes (as at the outset of the 1982 campaign) they were unable to  translate them into tangible long-term deterrence. Because neither the IDF nor  the Israeli public had been prepared for a war of annihilation against the PLO,  the Israeli leadership hesitated at critical junctures, allowing the PLO to  escape, and turning early military successes into perceived failures.

Israel  persisted in this inconclusive policy against Hezbollah, which replaced the PLO  on Israel’s northern border. In 1993 (Operation Accountability) and 1995  (Operation Grapes of Wrath) Israel launched standoff air and artillery attacks  against Hezbollah without success, but engendering international disapproval when  civilian human shields were killed. In 2000, Israel gave up against Hezbollah  and pulled out of Lebanon.

This  led to the 2006 War against Hezbollah, which though widely perceived as an  Israeli defeat, nonetheless has produced a quiet northern border for the past  six years. The Israelis made many mistakes during the 2006 campaign, first among them,  approaching it from the outset as an operation to retaliate for a Hezbollah  attack and compel the Lebanese government to rein in and control the  organization. But a few days into the campaign, when it appeared that Hezbollah  was not being deterred and that the Lebanese government was unable or unwilling  to act, Israel appeared to change its rhetorical tune, with Israeli officers and  ministers speaking of destroying Hezbollah — a traditional military objective.

The  true objectives of Israel’s 2006 operation are unclear and subject to debate even to this day. It’s not certain that Israel’s  leaders ever had a firm idea of what they wanted to do. However, once Israel  reoriented the mission, or mission rhetoric, to destroying Hezbollah, or at  least its organization in Southern Lebanon (in fact the new operation was dubbed  “Change of Direction”), it seems to have had long-term deterrent effect  (although this was not necessarily apparent at  the time or shortly thereafter). Like Hamas, Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel  until the end of the war, but they have not fired any rockets  since.

Israel failed to destroy Hezbollah or even most of its infrastructure in South  Lebanon, which allowed Hezbollah to declare “victory” in the war. Despite this,  Hezbollah was apparently been deterred. Had Israel escalated more, attacked Syrian supply routes, and pressed the  attack further, the results would have likely been better. Still, the Lebanese  border has remained quiet for six years now, a nearly unprecedented period in  Israel’s entire history. Hezbollah’s loquacious leader Hassan Nasrallah is  judged the ultimate intensity of the Israeli response and has since gone to  ground, rarely emerging. The war was a  defeat for Nasrallah too.

Still,  the IDF’s overall performance in the 2006 War was disturbing enough that  Israel established the Winograd Commission to investigate the reasons for the campaign’s  shortcomings, and recommend reforms. One of the commission’s findings was that  “standoff fires,” like the air and artillery strikes that solely comprised  Pillar of Defense, were an ineffective tactic for stopping or deterring rocket  fire.

When  Israel launched Operation Cast Lead four years ago, it combined standoff fires  and a ground attack with great success. Indeed, Israel might have easily destroyed Hamas  had it pressed its attack for a few more days. Its failure to do so convinced  Hamas that Israel lacked the will to destroy it, and Hamas quickly returned to  its policy of intermittent rocket fire which finally provoked Pillar of Defense.  There is no reason to assume that such a standoff operation, which was  castigated by the Winograd Commission, will work to deter Hamas today. Indeed,  the reason Hamas launched a dozen missiles right after the “cease-fire” went  into effect, was to make just that point.

The  only way to deter a radical Islamist organization like Hamas or Hezbollah is to  destroy it — or at least try. Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran will not be deterred by  military operations whose stated purpose is to deter. They are not deterred by  conventional considerations like casualties, damage, or civilian loss. To win,  all they must do is launch one more attack.

A  nuclear armed Iran (which seems likely) must be deterred from launching its own  attack. Iran will certainly not be deterred if it believes that Israel will hesitate to launch an  annihilating attack in return. For Israel, the stakes of letting Hamas fight on  another day are greater than whether that organization will be able to launch  missiles in the future. It is the message Israeli restraint sends to its most  potent enemies.

Since  2006 Hezbollah has rearmed, and in the interim, the deterrent effect of the 2006  campaign will have eroded. Hezbollah and its patron Iran have certainly closely  watched Israel’s operation in Gaza, and to the extent they perceive a lack of  resolve, will test Israel again. Which is all the more reason why Israel’s early  termination of Pillar of Defense may well come back to haunt it.

Jonathan  Keiler’s novel of the Holocaust, Upfall, is available for sale at and other online  outlets.


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